Output externalities on total factor productivity by Davila Muro, Julio
Available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/152298
[Downloaded 2019/04/19 at 10:07:06 ]
"Output externalities on total factor productivity"
Davila Muro, Julio
Abstract
The impact that output has on future total factor productivity —i.e. the dynamic
complementarities shown to be empirically relevant in Cooper and Johri (1997)—
is not internalized by competitive agents. As a result, the allocation that a planner
would choose cannot be reached as a competitive equilibrium outcome (neither
for infinitely-lived agents nor for overlapping generations): the market return to
savings and wage rate are too low. The planner’s allocation can nonetheless be
implemented by a fiscal policy subsidizing as needed the returns to savings and
the wage rate. The exact policy differs depending on whether just past investment
or total output influences productivity: in the first case only capital returns need
to be subsidized, while in the second case labor income needs to be subsidized
too. The policy is balanced period-by-period by means of a lump-sum tax.
Document type : Document de travail (Working Paper)
Référence bibliographique
Davila Muro, Julio. Output externalities on total factor productivity.  CORE Discussion Paper ;
2014/37 (2014)
 
2014/37 
 
 
■ 
 
 
Output externalities  
on total factor productivity 
 
 
 
Julio Davila 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Operations Research 
and Econometrics 
 
Voie du Roman Pays, 34 
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve 
Belgium 
http://www.uclouvain.be/core 
D I S C U S S I O N  P A P E R  
 
CORE DISCUSSION PAPER 
2014/37 
 
Output externalities on total factor productivity 
 
Julio DAVILA 1  
 
September 2014 
 
Abstract 
The impact that output has on future total factor productivity —i.e. the dynamic complementarities 
shown to be empirically relevant in Cooper and Johri (1997)— is not internalized by competitive 
agents. As a result, the allocation that a planner would choose cannot be reached as a competitive 
equilibrium outcome (neither for infinitely-lived agents nor for overlapping generations): the market 
return to savings and wage rate are too low. The planner’s allocation can nonetheless be implemented 
by a fiscal policy subsidizing as needed the returns to savings and the wage rate. The exact policy 
differs depending on whether just past investment or total output influences productivity: in the first 
case only capital returns need to be subsidized, while in the second case labor income needs to be 
subsidized too. The policy is balanced period-by-period by means of a lump-sum tax. 
 
 
                                                           
1 Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. E-mail: Julio.davila@uclouvain.be 
 
The author thanks Andrés Carvajal for very helpful discussions about the results presented in this paper. Insightful 
feedback from David de la Croix on a previous version of this paper is greatly thanked too. The author gratefully 
thanks funding from the Belgian FRNS PDR-2012 Research Project No. 14568807. 
1. Introduction
It is well known that output is not just about pumping capital and labor into the
production process. Aspects other than just quantities matter. Total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) is precisely thought to capture how labor and capital contribute to the
output of an economy in ways other than by their amounts. In practice, TFP varia-
tions are measured as the residual increase in output not accounted for by increases
in capital and labor, and hence the concept offers no explanation about its deter-
minants. A broad range of candidates have been put forward to explain changes in
total factor productivity, including changes in technology, innovations, human capi-
tal accumulation, learning by doing, organizational and management improvements,
among others.1 Such a panoply shows that we are still far from really understand-
ing what drives changes in total factor productivity. But it obviously matters (for
policy choices) to know what exactly drives more forcefully improvements in TFP,
in particular whether it is just investment or the entire output.
That R+D investments have a huge potential in raising productivity is well under-
stood, but the impact on productivity of all other expenditures comprised in the
output —including expenditures that would normally be classified as consumption—
is far from being negligible too, as established in Cooper and Johri (1997) in the
context of a stochastic growth model of infinitely-lived agents. In effect, among
the drivers of total factor productivity can be found the way work is organized,
the specific skills developed on the jobs as well as, more generally, human capital
accumulation. Although the latter, usually measured by years of schooling, may
well be classified as an expenditure distinct from consumption, its effectiveness —
as well as that of organizational skills and the working of society’s institutions and
legal framework— is no doubt greatly enhanced by expenditures that definitely fall
into the category of mere consumption, from reading habits to food consumption
at early stages (through the enhancement of cognitive skills).2 More generally, a
1Candidly enough, Easterly and Levine (2001) report that “we do not have empirical evidence [...]
that confidently assesses the relative importance of each of these conceptions of TFP in explaining
economic growth. Economists need to provide much more shape and substance to the amorphous
term TFP”. Even more to the point, the title in Prescott (1998) says it all.
2To better realize to what extent merely consumed output may impact TFP just think of the
ultimate consumption good: food. Empirical evidence shows that malnutrition from gestation
to 24 months affects brain development to the point of translating into a 7% lower perfor-
mance at 8 years old in mathematics, 19% lower in reading, 13% lower in writing, which com-
pounds into a 20% lower future earnings —as reported in Save the Children Foundation (2013)
(www.savethechildren.org.uk), from Young Lives (www.younglives.org.uk), a longitudinal study of
12,000 children across four countries throughout their lives. If this reflects, as it might be expected,
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higher economic activity conveyed by a higher output reflects also an increase in the
number, length, and density of supply chains and organizational links within and
between firms that can only facilitate even higher increases in output in the future
for the same increase in the inputs. All in all, it is only natural to expect to see
a positive impact of past realizations of overall output per capita —i.e. including
consumption per capita— on the total factor productivity of an economy, if only
because more productive economies (i.e. with a longer history of higher per capita
outputs) can afford a better trained and educated work force, a more secure and
better enforced legal framework for property rights and contracts, a better orga-
nization of complex production processes, and a denser network of working links
within and between firms that all allow for a more efficient use of capital and labor.
The intuition therefore extends that of the dynamic complementarities quantita-
tively assessed in Cooper and Johri (1997) and supposed to represent the learning
spillovers introduced in Durlauf (1991).
While Cooper and Johri (1997) have shown these dynamic complementarities to
play an empirically relevant role in the propagation of the business cycle, I focus in
this paper on finding policies allowing to exploit them in order to improve upon the
laissez-fare outcome. In effect, economic agents acting in a competitive environment
do not internalize in their decisions the additional positive impact that their saving,
labor supply, and consumption decisions have on future output, via current output,
through the improvement of future total factor productivity. As a result, competi-
tive equilibria lead to allocations that differ from those that a planner internalizing
such impact would choose. I show this to be the case for both infinitely-lived agents
economies and overlapping generations economies, and I provide fiscal policies al-
lowing to support the planner’s choice as a market outcome.
More precisely, I show in Section 2 that, because of the impact of past output
per capita on current total factor productivity, the competitive equilibrium of an
infinitely-lived agent economy differs from the allocation that a planner internalizing
the effect would choose for that economy (Proposition 3). In particular, the market
systematically remunerates the agents too little for their savings and labor: the
wage rate and the return to capital are, at every period, lower than those that the
planner would choose instead. As a consequence, capital and labor supply are too
low.
I show next, nonetheless, how a policy of subsidies and lump-sum taxes decentral-
izes the planner’s choice (Proposition 5), allowing for fully exploiting the dynamic
an impact on labor productivity, its size is far from immaterial.
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complementarities. The policy requires subsidizing linearly both capital and labor
incomes at a common rate depending positively on the sensitivity of total factor
productivity to past output. The policy is funded by means of a lump-sum tax. The
exact decentralization requires from the policy-maker to choose the rate depending
on the future marginal productivity of capital though, and hence to have perfect
foresight.3 Notwithstanding, for the widely used case of logarithmic utilities, a neo-
classical production, and a total factor productivity that is a power function of past
output, Proposition 6 establishes that when the policy is made to depend on lagged,
observed variables instead, then convergence towards the planner’s choice obtains.
In order to make sure that the results are not special to the infinitely-lived agents
setup, I show next in Section 3 analogous results for an overlapping generations
economy with heterogeneous agents and population growth. Specifically, the steady
state that a utilitarian planner would choose (maximizing the sum of utilities of a
distribution of identical generations) cannot be a competitive equilibrium outcome
when past outputs have an impact on total factor productivity (Proposition 9).
As in the infinitely-lived agents case, the market systematically remunerates the
agents too little for their labor: the return to capital and the wage rate are, at
every period, lower than the one the planner would choose instead. As in the
previous setup, a policy of subsidies and lump-sum taxes allows, nonetheless, to
implement the planner’s choice as a competitive outcome (Propositions 10 and 11).
Interestingly enough, form the analysis it follows that for an egalitarian planner’s
steady state the population growth rate needs to exceed the return to capital.
Finally, Section 4 addresses the issue of whether the entire past output is actually
needed to capture the externalities on total factor productivity, instead of just
past investment, as underlined by the literature on learning-by-doing starting with
Arrow (1962), Levhari (1966), and Sheshinski (1967) —the driving idea being that
past investments in physical capital increase the productivity of labor through a
process of gradually driving up the skills needed to operate increasingly complex
machinery or, more generally, working processes— or even the spillovers from R+D
investments by other firms as in Romer (1986) —similarly, with the externality
coming from the knowledge spillovers across firms. In effect, one might legitimately
conjecture that, from the positive correlation between investment and output, it
might eventually make no difference to pick either as the channel of the externality
in order to capture the effect. Section 5 clarifies, nonetheless, that whether the
externality is exerted through just investment or total output makes a difference
indeed. Specifically, I show that implementing the planner’s choice requires two
3Although the agents are routinely and less scrupulously assumed to have perfect foresight anyway.
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qualitatively different policies, depending on whether just past investment or the
entire past output affects total factor productivity: subsidizing the returns to capital
suffices in the case investment is the only source of externality, while subsidizing
the returns to labor too is necessary in the case the entire output has an impact on
future total factor productivity.
2. Output externalities on TFP with infinitely-lived agents
2.1 Competitive equilibria and planner’s allocations.
Consider an infinitely-lived representative agent choosing the consumption ct, labor
supply lt, and capital savings kt+1, for all t = 0, 1, . . . , that maximize his discounted
sum of utilities subject to a sequence of budget constraints, i.e.
max
ct,lt,kt+1≥0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(ct)− v(lt)
]
ct + kt+1 ≤ wtlt + rtkt
(1)
given an initial capital endowment k0 and sequences wt, rt of factor prices. Under
standard assumptions guaranteeing the concavity of the objective and the interiority
of the solution, the agent’s choice is necessarily characterized by the first-order
conditions  βtu′(ct)−βtv′(lt)
0
 = λt
 1−wt
1
+ λt+1
 00
−rt+1
 (2)
for some multipliers λt > 0, and the budget constraints binding
ct + kt+1 = wtlt + rtkt (3)
for all t ≥ 0.
Output is produced out of capital (i.e. saved output)4 and labor through a constant
returns to scale neoclassical production function whose total factor productivity
depends on the previous period output, so that the output at t is given by
yt = A(yt−1)F (kt, lt) (4)
4For the sake of notational simplicity, and without loss of generality, capital is supposed to depre-
ciate entirely in one period.
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I will assume a positive correlation between output and total factor productivity,
i.e. A′ > 0, and that A′′ < 0, which guarantees the convexity of the planner’s
problem below.
Under the assumption of perfect competition in the capital and labor markets,
factors are remunerated by their marginal productivities and, therefore, the factor
prices are
wt = A(yt−1)FL(kt, lt)
rt = A(yt−1)FK(kt, lt)
(5)
Conditions (2) through (5) characterize necessarily and sufficiently the competitive
equilibria of this economy, as summarized in the next proposition —whose proof is
straightforward from the conditions above.5
Proposition 1. A competitive equilibrium allocation of the infinitely-lived agents
economy with output-driven TFP, given an initial capital endowment k0 and an ini-
tial total factor productivity A(y−1), is characterized by sequences of consumption
c˜t, labor supply l˜t, capital savings k˜t+1, and output y˜t, satisfying
v′(lt)
u′(ct)
= A(yt−1)FL(kt, lt)
1
β
u′(ct)
u′(ct+1)
= A(yt)FK(kt+1, lt+1)
ct + kt+1 = A(yt−1)F (kt, lt)
yt = A(yt−1)F (kt, lt)
(6)
each period t ≥ 0, given k0, y−1.
Note that, under competitive conditions, the agent only takes into account his
budget constraints in (1) and not the impact of past output on productivity in (4)
and hence on the factor prices that remunerate his labor and savings. A planner
would internalize this impact instead, and therefore would solve the problem
max
ct,lt,kt+1,yt≥0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(ct)− v(lt)
]
ct + kt+1 ≤ yt
yt ≤ A(yt−1)F (kt, lt)
(7)
5The binding budget constraints in (3) are, because of the linear homogeneity of the neoclassical
production function, equivalent to the feasibility of the allocation.
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given k0, y−1, where the planner solves as well for the sequence of outputs yt, in-
ternalizing this way its effect on total factor productivity.6 The planner’s choice,
given an initial condition k0, y−1, is characterized by the conditions stated in the
next proposition, whose proof is provided in Appendix.
Proposition 2. The planner’s allocation for the infinitely-lived agents economy
with output-driven TFP, given an initial capital endowment k0 and an initial total
factor productivity A(y−1), is characterized by sequences of consumption c¯t, labor
supply l¯t, capital savings k¯t+1, and output y¯t, satisfying
v′(lt)
u′(ct)
= A(yt−1)FL(kt, lt)
[
1 +
A′(yt)F (kt+1, lt+1)
A(yt)FK(kt+1, lt+1)
]
1
β
u′(ct)
u′(ct+1)
= A(yt)FK(kt+1, lt+1)
[
1 +
A′(yt+1)F (kt+2, lt+2)
A(yt+1)FK(kt+2, lt+2)
]
ct + kt+1 = A(yt−1)F (kt, lt)
yt = A(yt−1)F (kt, lt)
(8)
each period t ≥ 0, given k0, y−1.
From the characterizations in Propositions 1 and 2 of, respectively, the market allo-
cation given some initial conditions and the one the planner would choose instead,
it can be seen that the market remunerates the agents too little for their savings
—and hence consume too early— as well as for their labor —and hence work too
little— as the next proposition establishes.
Proposition 3. In the infinitely-lived agents economy with output-driven TFP,
given any initial condition, the planner’s allocation is not a competitive equilibrium
allocation. More specifically, the agents get at any equilibrium allocation
(1) a too low return on their savings —compared to the implicit return the
planner would choose at the equilibrium allocation— and
6Note that the constrained set in (7) is not the same as the one represented by the (sequence of)
feasibility constraint(s) resulting form collapsing the two in (7) into a single one as in
ct + kt+1 ≤ A(yt−1)F (kt, lt)
given k0, y−1. The reason is that the latter does not constrain y0 (resulting in the maximization
not having a solution) while this is not the case for the constrained set above given k0, y−1. A
crucial bound on y0 is inadvertently dropped when the two (sequences of) constraints in (7) are
collapsed into the single one above.
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(2) a too low wage —compared to the implicit wage the planner would choose
at the equilibrium allocation.
Proof. Since a competitive equilibrium allocation satisfies, at any given t,
1
β
u′(c˜t)
u′(c˜t+1)
= A(y˜t)FK(k˜t+1, l˜t+1) (9)
in (6), if A′ > 0, then
1
β
u′(c˜t)
u′(c˜t+1)
< A(y˜t)FK(k˜t+1, l˜t+1)
[
1 +
A′(y˜t+1)F (k˜t+2, l˜t+2)
A(y˜t+1)FK(k˜t+2, l˜t+2)
]
(10)
so that it cannot satisfy the conditions (8) characterizing the planner’s allocation,
which establishes the main result.
Moreover, the left-hand side in (10) is the equilibrium return to savings at t + 1,
while the right-hand side is the implicit return the planner would choose at the
equilibrium allocation, which establishes (1) in Proposition 3. Similarly, since at
the competitive equilibrium allocation it holds
v′(l˜t)
u′(c˜t)
= A(y˜t−1)FL(k˜t, l˜t) (11)
in (6), if A′ > 0, then
v′(l˜t)
u′(c˜t)
< A(y˜t−1)FL(k˜t, l˜t)
[
1 +
A′(y˜t)F (k˜t+1, l˜t+1)
A(y˜t)FK(k˜t+1, l˜t+1)
]
(12)
so that the equilibrium wage rate, equal to the left-hand side in (12), is lower than
the implicit wage the planner would choose at the equilibrium allocation, in the
right-hand side, which establishes (2) in Proposition 3. QED
In a nutshell, Proposition 3 establishes that the factors of production are priced too
cheaply by the market, which distorts their supply by the agents. I provide next a
policy that undoes these distortions by subsidizing labor and capital in a balanced-
budget way (by means of a lump-sum tax) and allows, therefore, to decentralize the
planner’s allocation.
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2.2 Decentralization of the planner’s allocation as a competitive equilib-
rium.
Consider now the same infinitely-lived agents economy with output-driven TFP, but
under a period-by-period balanced policy of linear subsidies or taxes (depending on
the sign) on capital and labor incomes —possibly at different rates τ lt and τ
k
t across
time and factors— and lump-sum taxes or transfers Tt, so that the representative
agent faces the problem
max
ct,lt,kt+1≥0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(ct)− v(lt)
]
ct + kt+1 ≤ (1 + τ lt )wtlt + (1 + τkt )rtkt − Tt
(13)
given an initial capital endowment k0 and some sequences wt, kt, τ lt , τ
k
t , and Tt of
factors prices, tax or subsidy rates, and lump-sum taxes or transfers. Under stan-
dard assumptions, the agent’s choice is characterized by the first-order conditions βtu′(ct)−βtv′(lt)
0
 = λt
 1−(1 + τ lt )wt
1
+ λt+1
 00
−(1 + τkt+1)rt+1
 (14)
for some multipliers λt > 0, and the binding constraints
ct + kt+1 = (1 + τ lt )wtlt + (1 + τ
k
t )rtkt − Tt (15)
for all t ≥ 0. For the government budget to be balanced period by period it must
hold, at every t,
Tt = τ ltwtlt + τ
k
t rtkt (16)
which along with the budget constraints implies the feasibility of the allocation.
The competitive equilibria under this policy are then necessarily and sufficiently
characterized by conditions (14) through (16) above, with the factor prices be-
ing equal to the marginal productivities, from which the next proposition follows
straightforwardly.
Proposition 4. A competitive equilibrium allocation of the infinitely-lived agents
economy with output-driven TFP —under a period-by-period balanced policy of
linear subsidies/taxes on capital and labor incomes at rates τ lt and τ
k
t respectively,
9
and lump-sum taxes/transfers Tt— is characterized by sequences for consumption
ct, labor supply lt, capital savings kt+1, and output yt, such that for each period
t ≥ 0
v′(lt)
u′(ct)
= (1 + τ lt )A(yt−1)FL(kt, lt)
1
β
u′(ct)
u′(ct+1)
= (1 + τkt+1)A(yt)FK(kt+1, lt+1)
ct + kt+1 = A(yt−1)F (kt, lt)
yt = A(yt−1)F (kt, lt)
(17)
given initial conditions k0, y−1.
From the comparison of the conditions characterizing the planner’s choice in (8) and
the competitive equilibria under this policy in (17), it follows that the planner’s
choice is an equilibrium outcome for the subsidy/tax rates provided in the next
proposition.
Proposition 5. The planner’s allocation, for given initial conditions k0, y−1, of the
infinitely-lived agents economy with output-driven TFP, is the competitive equilib-
rium allocation under common linear subsidies on capital and labor incomes at rates
satisfying7
τt =
A′(yt)F (kt+1, lt+1)
A(yt)FK(kt+1, lt+1)
> 0 (18)
and lump-sum taxes
Tt = τtA(yt−1)F (kt, lt). (19)
From the viewpoint of providing a policy decentralizing the planners allocation for
any given initial conditions, it should be noted that the common subsidy rate τt
in (18) depends on the agent’s capital savings and labour supply one period later.
This might be considered problematic since it would require perfect foresight from
the policy-maker.8 The next proposition establishes, nonetheless, that making the
7Note that it follows from the assumption A′ > 0 that the rate τt in (16) is positive and corresponds
therefore to a subsidy.
8Although the representative agent himself is supposed to have perfect foresight of factor prices,
and is choosing all his future capital savings and labor supplies at the outset of the economy,
rather than sequentially.
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policy depend on observed past values of labor and savings still succeeds in making
the economy converge to the planner’s allocation, in the case of log utilities, a power
function for the total factor productivity, and a neoclassical production function.
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 6. In the infinitely-lived representative agent economy with
u(c)− v(l) = ln c+ ln(1− l)
A(y)F (k, l) = yγkαl1−α
(20)
and γ − α < 1β < γ + α, the competitive equilibrium converges to the planner’s
allocation if, at each period t, labor and capital incomes are linearly subsidized at
the common rate
τt =
A′(yt−2)F (kt−1, lt−1)
A(yt−2)FK(kt−1, lt−1)
(21)
by means of a lump-sum tax
Tt =
A′(yt−2)F (kt−1, lt−1)
A(yt−2)FK(kt−1, lt−1)
A(y − 1)F (kt, lt). (22)
Moreover, the planner’s allocation growth rate is γ + α > 1.
In order to establish the robustness of these results and enlarge their scope, we
extend them in the next section to economies of heterogeneous overlapping gener-
ations.
3. Output externalities on TFP with overlapping generations
3.1 Competitive equilibria and planner’s allocations.
Consider now overlapping generations of heterogeneous, two-period lived agents
deriving utility from consumption and disutility from working when young. Popu-
lation grows by a factor n > 0 every period, but the distribution of agents across a
finite number of types remains constant within each generation,9 with µi > 0 being
9For the sake of simplicity, I assume no impact from the allocation of resources on the distribution
of types.
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the proportion of agents of type i within each generation, so that
∑
i µi = 1. In
order to finance their consumptions when young and old, the agents choose how
much to work when young and how much to save (and how, i.e. whether in capital
or in money). Specifically, an agent of type i born at date t chooses a labor supply
lit, consumptions cit0 , c
it
1 , and savings in capital and money k
it,M it, that solve
max
0≤cit0 ,cit1 ,kit,Mit,lit
ui0(c
it
0 ) + u
i
1(c
it
1 )− vi(lit)
cit0 + k
it +
M it
pt
≤ wtlit
cit1 ≤ rt+1kit +
M it
pt+1
(23)
given the monetary prices of output pt, pt+1 and the real wage and rental rate of
capital wt, rt+1 during his lifetime. Under standard assumptions guaranteeing the
concavity of the objective and the interiority of the solution, his choice is then
characterized by the first-order conditions

ui′0 (c
it
0 )
ui′1 (c
it
1 )
0
0
−vi(lit)
 = λt

1
0
1
1
pt−wt
+ µt

0
1
−rt+1
− 1pt+1
0
 (24)
for some λt, µt > 0, and the budget constraints in (23) binding.
At the outset of the economy, an agent of type i born old at date 0 and endowed
with initial savings in capital and money ki0,M i0, trivially chooses a consumption
ci01 , that solves
max
0≤ci01
ui1(c
i0
1 )
ci01 ≤ r1ki0 +
M i0
p1
(25)
given the initial monetary price of output p1 and the initial real rental rate of capital
r1.
As before, output at t is produced out of capital and labor through a constant
returns to scale neoclassical production function whose total factor productivity
12
depends on period t− 1 output per worker,10 so that the output per worker at t is
given by
yt = A(yt−1)F (
kt−1
n
, lt) (26)
where kt−1 =
∑
i µ
ikit−1 is the average/aggregate capital savings of generation t−1
and lt =
∑
i µ
ilit is the average/aggregate labor supply of generation t. I will again
assume A′ > 0 and A′′ < 0. Under the assumption of perfect competition in the
capital and labor markets, the factor prices are, therefore,
wt = A(yt−1)FL(
kt−1
n
, lt)
rt+1 = A(yt)FK(
kt
n
, lt+1)
(27)
It is straightforward to see from the budget constraints that the feasibility of the
allocation of resources is equivalent to
M t
M t+1
= n (28)
where M t =
∑
i µ
iM it is, similarly, the average/aggregate monetary savings of
generation t.
From conditions (24) through (28) and the binding budget constraints follows
straightforwardly the characterization of the competitive equilibria of this economy
provided in the next proposition.
Proposition 7. A competitive equilibrium allocation of the heterogeneous over-
lapping generations economy with output-driven TFP, given an initial old-born
generation endowed with ki0,M i0 for each agent of type i, and an initial total fac-
tor productivity A(y0), is characterized by a consumption profile c˜it0 , c˜
it
1 , capital
10Now that population is growing, the fact that it is past output per worker rather than past
output that has an impact on total factor productivity intends to convey the idea that increases
in total factor productivity are obtained through resource-consuming organizational, institutional,
and human capital improvements that are all the more efficient when they permeate the entire
society, hence the need to put it in relation to population size. Period t output per worker Yt
nt
is
proportional to period t output per capita Yt
nt−1+nt by a factor
n
1+n
so that it is equivalent to
assume total factor productivity to depend on any of the two.
13
savings k˜it, monetary savings M˜ it, and labor supply l˜it, for each type i in each
period t ≥ 1, along with prices pt, satisfying
ui′0 (c
it
0 )
ui′1 (c
it
1 )
=
pt
pt+1
= A(yt)FK(
kt
n
, lt+1)
vi′(lit)
ui′0 (c
it
0 )
= A(yt−1)FL(
kt−1
n
, lt)
cit0 + k
it +
M it
pt
= A(yt−1)FL(
kt−1
n
, lt)lit
cit1 = A(yt)FK(
kt
n
, lt+1)kit +
M it
pt+1
yt = A(yt−1)F (
kt−1
n
, lt)
M t
M t+1
= n
(29)
—where kt =
∑
i µ
ikit, M t =
∑
i µ
iM it, and lt =
∑
i µ
ilit are, respectively, the
aggregate capital, monetary savings and labor supply— at each period t ≥ 1, and
ci01 = A(y0)FK(
k0
n
, l1)ki0 +
M i0
p1
given ki0,M i0, y0.
As for the planner’s choice, given the stationary distribution of different types of
agents, a utilitarian planner would choose to allocate resources in such a way that
a(n exponentially) weighted sum of the utility of the average agent across all gen-
erations (including the initial old), is maximized, that is to say,
max
0≤cit0 ,cit1 ,lit,kit,yt
η−1
∑
i
µiui1(c
i0
1 ) +
+∞∑
t=1
{
ηt−1
∑
i
µi
[
ui0(c
it
0 ) + u
i
1(c
it
1 )− vi(lit)
]}
∑
i
µi
[
cit0 +
cit−11
n
+ kit
] ≤ yt
yt ≤ A(yt−1)F (k
t−1
n
, lt)
(30)
—where kt =
∑
i µ
ikit and lt =
∑
i µ
ilit— given ki0, y0.
The planner’s choice is characterized by the conditions provided in the following
proposition, whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
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Proposition 8. The planner’s allocation for the heterogeneous overlapping gener-
ations economy with output-driven TFP, given an initial old-born generation en-
dowed with ki0, y0, is characterized by a consumption profile c¯
it
0 , c¯
it
1 , capital savings
k¯it, and labor supply l¯it, for each agent of each type i in each period t ≥ 1, and a
consumption c¯i01 for each initial old of each type i, satisfying
ui′0 (c
it
0 )
ui′1 (c
it
1 )
= n
λt
λt+1
= A(yt)FK(
kt
n
,lt+1)
[
1 +
A′(yt+1)F (k
t+1
n , l
t+2)
A(yt+1)FK(k
t+1
n , l
t+2)
n
]
vi′(lit)
ui′0 (c
it
0 )
= A(yt−1)FL(
kt−1
n
, lt)
[
1 +
A′(yt)F (k
t
n , l
t+1)
A(yt)FK(k
t
n , l
t+1)
n
]
∑
i
µi
[
cit0 +
cit−11
n
+ kit
]
= yt
yt = A(yt−1)F (
kt−1
n
, lt)
(31)
for positive multipliers λt, ρt, with t ≥ 1, satisfying
λt = ρt+1A(yt)FK(
kt
n
, lt+1)
1
n
ρt = ρt+1
[
A′(yt)F (
kt
n
, lt+1) +A(yt)FK(
kt
n
, lt+1)
1
n
] (32)
and
λ1 = η−1ui′1 (c
i0
1 )n
—where kt =
∑
i µ
ikit and lt =
∑
i µ
ilit— given ki0, y0.
From the second equations in (29) and (31) in Proposition 7 and 8 respectively, it
follows immediately that the planner’s allocation cannot be a laissez-faire compet-
itive equilibrium outcome. In particular, as in the infinitely-lived agents setup, the
overlapping generations get paid too little for their labor in a competitive equilib-
rium, and get remunerated too little for their savings as well, and as established in
the next proposition.
Proposition 9. In a heterogeneous overlapping generations economy with output-
driven TFP starting from any given any initial condition, the planner’s allocation
is not a competitive equilibrium allocation. More specifically, the agents get, at any
equilibrium allocation,
(1) a too low return on their savings —compared to the implicit return the
planner would choose at the equilibrium allocation— and
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(2) a too low wage —compared to the implicit wage the planner would choose
under the same conditions.
Proof. Since a competitive allocation satisfies, at any given t,
ui′0 (c˜
it
0 )
ui′1 (c˜
it
1 )
= A(y˜t−1)FK(
k˜t−1
n
, l˜t) (33)
in (29), if A′ > 0, then
ui′0 (c˜
it
0 )
ui′1 (c˜
it
1 )
< A(y˜t−1)FK(
k˜t−1
n
, l˜t)
[
1 +
A′(y˜t)F ( k˜
t
n , l˜
t+1)
A(y˜t)FK( k˜
t
n , l˜
t+1)
n
]
(34)
so that it cannot satisfy the conditions in (31) characterizing the planner’s alloca-
tion.
Moreover, the left-hand side in (34), is the equilibrium return to savings at t + 1,
while the right-hand side is the implicit return the planner would choose at the
equilibrium allocation, which establishes (1) in Proposition 9.
Similarly, since a competitive allocation satisfies, at any given t,
vi′(l˜it)
ui′0 (c˜
it
0 )
= A(y˜t−1)FL(
k˜t−1
n
, l˜t) (35)
in (29), if A′ > 0, then
vi′0 (l˜
it)
ui′0 (c˜
it
0 )
< A(y˜t−1)FL(
k˜t−1
n
, l˜t)
[
1 +
A′(y˜t)F ( k˜
t
n , l˜
t+1)
A(y˜t)FK( k˜
t
n , l˜
t+1)
n
]
(36)
so that the equilibrium wage rate, equal to the left-hand side in (36), is lower than
the implicit wage the planner would choose at the equilibrium allocation, in the
right-hand side, which establishes (2) in Proposition 9. QED
In the next section I will address the issue of whether there is a policy intervention
that allows for the decentralization of the planner’s allocation as a competitive
equilibrium outcome.
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3.2 Decentralization of the planner’s allocation as a competitive equilib-
rium.
Assume the agents face labor and capital income subsidies (or taxes, depending
on the sign of the rate) and lump-sum tax or subsidy as needed to balance each
period the government budget. Specifically, assume generation t is subject to labor
and capital subsidy or income tax rates τ t0, τ
t
1 and a first-period lump-sum tax or
transfer T t0 .
11 Then the problem faced by an agent of type i and born at date t is
max
0≤cit0 ,cit1 ,k,Mit,lit
ui0(c
it
0 ) + u
i
1(c
it
1 )− vi(lit)
cit0 + k
it +
M it
pt
≤ (1 + τ t0)wtlit − T t0
cit1 ≤ (1 + τ t1)rt+1kit +
M it
pt+1
(37)
given the prices pt, pt+1, wt, rt+1, the rates τ t0, τ
t
1, and the lump-sums T
t
0 . The
competitive equilibria of the economy under a period-by-period balanced policy of
this type are then characterized by
ui′0 (c
it
0 )
ui′1 (c
it
1 )
=
pt
pt+1
= A(yt)FK(
kt
n
, lt+1)(1 + τ t1)
vi′(lit)
ui′0 (c
it
0 )
= A(yt−1)FL(
kt−1
n
, lt)(1 + τ t0)
cit0 + k
it +
M it
pt
= A(yt−1)FL(
kt−1
n
, lt)(1 + τ t0)l
it − T t0
cit1 = A(yt)FK(
kt
n
, lt+1)(1 + τ t1)k
it +
M it
pt+1
yt = A(yt−1)F (
kt−1
n
, lt)
M t
M t+1
= n
(38)
—where kt =
∑
i µ
ikit, M t =
∑
i µ
iM it, and lt =
∑
i µ
ilit — at each period t ≥ 1,
and
ci01 = A(y0)FK(
k0
n
, l1)(1 + τ01 )k
i0 +
M i0
p1
(39)
11As a matter of fact, the lump-sum tax needs not be on the young agents labor income as
expressed above. Any distribution of the amount to be raised between young and old, i.e. between
labor and capital income, would do the job.
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given ki0,M i0, y0, with
A(yt−1)
∑
i
µi
[
FL(
kt−1
n
, lt)litτ t0 + FK(
kt−1
n
, lt)kitτ t−11
]
= T t0 (40)
for all t ≥ 1.
From the comparison of the conditions characterizing the planner’s choice in (31)
and the competitive equilibria under this policy above, it follows that the planner’s
choice is an equilibrium outcome for the subsidy/tax rates provided in the next
proposition.
Proposition 10. In the heterogeneous overlapping generations economy with out-
put-driven TFP, the planner’s allocation is the competitive equilibrium allocation
under the policy subsidizing labor and capital income at the rates
τ t0 =
A′(yt)F (k
t
n , l
t+1)
A(yt)FK(k
t
n , l
t+1)
n = τ t−11 (41)
—where kt =
∑
i µ
ikit, lt =
∑
i µ
ilit— by means of the lump-sum tax on the first
period income in (*) above.
As it was the case in the infinitely-lived agents setup, the subsidy rates τ t0, τ
t−1
1
at any given period t in (41) depend, in particular, on the labour supplied by the
next generation one period later. That a policy depending instead on observed past
values still succeeds in making the economy converge to the planner’s allocation in
a specific case — like in the previous case of log utilities, a power function for the
total factor productivity, and a neoclassical production— can be established along
the lines of the argument presented in the Appendix for the infinitely-lived agents
case. The decentralization as a competitive equilibrium of the allocation chosen by
an egalitarian planner treating all generations identically is shown next instead. It
reveals
A planner treating all generations equally would choose the steady state that is the
limit to the solution to the problem in (30) as the positive rate η < 1 with which the
planner weights less and less future generations converges to 1 —so that he becomes
increasingly egalitarian. That is to say, the planner would choose the consumptions
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c¯i0, c¯
i
1, capital savings k¯
i, and labor supply l¯i, for all agents of each type i, along
with a level of output per worker y¯, satisfying12
ui′0 (c
i
0)
ui′1 (c
i
1)
= n =
A(y)FK( kn , l)
1−A′(y)F ( kn , l)
vi′(li)
ui′0 (c
i
0)
=
A(y)FL( kn , l)
1−A′(y)F ( kn , l)∑
i
µi
[
ci0 +
ci1
n
+ ki
]
= y
y =A(y)F (
k
n
, l)
(42)
where k =
∑
i µ
iki and l =
∑
i µ
ili.
From the conditions characterizing the egalitarian planner’s steady state in (42)
and the competitive equilibrium steady state under the policy above follows the
next proposition establishing the factor prices subsidy rates and lump-sum tax
that decentralize the planner’s choice. Specifically, Proposition 11 establishes that
the subsidy rate supporting the steady state of an egalitarian planner treating all
generations equally is determined by the ratio of the population growth to the
marginal productivity of capital at the planner’s steady state. Interestingly enough,
it establishes at the same time that an egalitarian steady state requires therefore
the population growth factor to exceed the return to capital. The proof is provided
in Appendix.
Proposition 11. In the heterogeneous overlapping generations economy with out-
put-driven TFP, an egalitarian planner’s steady state requires a population growth
rate higher than the return to capital, and is the competitive equilibrium steady
state c¯i0, c¯
i
1, k¯
i, l¯i, y¯ resulting from the policy subsidizing labor and capital income
at the common rate
τ =
n
A(y¯)FK( k¯n , l¯)
− 1 > 0 (43)
—where k¯ =
∑
i µ
ik¯i, l¯ =
∑
i µ
i l¯i— by means of the following lump-sum tax on the
first period income
T0 = τA(y¯)F (
k¯
n
, l¯) (44)
12Note that at a planner’s steady state necessarily 1 − A′(y)F ( k
n
, l) > 0 since y ≤ A(y)F ( k
n
, l)
needs to be binding at the planner choice. The details can be found in the Appendix.
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4. TFP increases: past output, past consumption or past investment?
The previous sections show the impact of a positive externality of past levels of
output, without distinction, on the productivity of factors. Nonetheless, different
components of output can be thought of as possible channels for such an externality,
from the learning-by-doing effect associated to new investments and capital accu-
mulation, to the effect of consumption on the (cognitive) skills and health of the
labor force, for instance, on top of the impact of publicly provided infrastructure
funded by taxes.
This section establishes that it makes a difference whether the externality is ex-
erted through one or several of this channels. As a consequence, implementing the
planner’s choices requires qualitatively different policies depending on the channel
through which the externality operates. This is done in the overlapping generations
framework with a representative agent for the sake of brevity but, as before, the re-
sults extend to the case of heterogeneous generations and the infinitely-lived agents
setup too.
4.1. Past investment only.
Consider the same overlapping generations economy as in Section 3 except for the
fact that the output per worker at t is now given by
yt = A(kt−1)F (
kt−1
n
, lt) (45)
It is straightforward to derive (following the analogous steps in the previous section)
the system characterizing the competitive equilibrium steady state in this case
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n = A(k)FK(
k
n
, l)
v′(l)
u′0(c0)
= A(k)FL(
k
n
, l)
c0 + k +m = A(k)FL(
k
n
, l)l
c1
n
= A(k)FK(
k
n
, l)
k
n
+m
(46)
As in previous sections, a utilitarian planner would choose, at a steady state, to
allocate resources as if he was to maximize the utility of the representative agent
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at the steady state, i.e.
max
0≤c0,c1,k,l
u0(c0) + u1(c1)− v(l)
c0 +
c1
n
+ k ≤ A(k)F (k
n
, l)
(47)
and his choice would therefore be characterized by the first-order conditions
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
0
−v′(l)
 = λ

1
1
n
1−A′(k)F ( kn , l)−A(k)FK( kn , l) 1n
−A(k)FL( kn , l)
 (48)
and the feasibility constraint binding. That is to say, the planner’s steady state is
a solution to
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n =
A(k)FK( kn , l)
1−A′(k)F ( kn , l)
v(l)
u′0(c0)
= A(k)FL(
k
n
, l)
c0 +
c1
n
+ k = A(k)F (
k
n
, l)
(49)
Note that in this case only the intertemporal trade-off between first and second
period consumptions is distorted in (46) compared to the planer’s conditions in
(49) by the lack on internalization of the externality by competitive agents. As a
consequence, a subsidy to the return to savings at a rate
τ1 =
A′(k¯)F ( k¯n , l¯)
1−A′(k¯)F ( k¯n , l¯)
(50)
financed by a first-period lump-sum tax
T0 = τ1A(y)FK(
k
n
, l)
k
n
(51)
suffices to decentralize the planner’s choice.
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4.2 Past consumption only.
Consider the same overlapping generations economy as in Section 3 except for the
fact that the output per worker at t is now given by
yt = A(ct−10 +
ct−21
n
)F (
kt−1
n
, lt) (52)
It is straightforward to derive (following the analogous steps in the previous section)
the system characterizing the competitive equilibrium steady state in this case
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n = A(c0 +
c1
n
)FK(
k
n
, l)
v′(l)
u′0(c0)
= A(c0 +
c1
n
)FL(
k
n
, l)
c0 + k +m = A(c0 +
c1
n
)FL(
k
n
, l)l
c1
n
= A(c0 +
c1
n
)FK(
k
n
, l)
k
n
+m
(53)
A utilitarian planner would again choose, at a steady state, to allocate resources so
as to maximize the utility of the representative agent at the steady state, i.e.
max
0≤c0,c1,k,l
u0(c0) + u1(c1)− v(l)
c0 +
c1
n
+ k ≤ A(c0 + c1
n
)F (
k
n
, l)
(54)
and his choice would therefore be characterized by the first-order conditions
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
0
−v′(l)
 = λ

1−A′(c0 + c1n )
1
n [1−A′(c0 + c1n )]
1−A(c0 + c1n )FK( kn , l) 1n
−A(c0 + c1n )FL( kn , l)
 (55)
and the feasibility constraint binding. That is to say, the planner’s steady state is
a solution to
u′0(c0)
u′1(c1)
= n = A(c0 +
c1
n
)FK(
k
n
, l)
v(l)
u′0(c0)
=
A(c0 + c1n )FL(
k
n , l)
1−A′(c0 + c1n )F ( kn , l)
c0 +
c1
n
+ k = A(k)F (
k
n
, l)
(56)
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Note that in this case only the trade-off between first period consumptions and
leisure is distorted in (53) compared to the planer’s conditions in (56) by the lack
on internalization of the externality by competitive agents. As a consequence, a
subsidy to the return to savings at a rate
τ0 =
A′(c¯0 + c¯1n )F (
k¯
n , l¯)
1−A′(c¯0 + c¯1n )F ( k¯n , l¯)
(57)
financed by a first-period lump-sum tax
T0 = τ0A(c¯0 +
c¯1
n
)FL(
k¯
n
, l) (58)
suffices to decentralize the planner’s choice.
Therefore, in the case the only positive externality on productivity comes from
learning by doing, only capital income must be subsidized at the expense of a
lump-sum tax on labor income. If the positive externality were to work its way
towards TFP through channels other than direct investment in capital, but spills
over from economic activity in general through output or total income, labor income
must be linearly subsidized as well as capital income at the expense of a lump sum
tax on labor income. It is thus important to know what the empirical evidence says
about the dependence of TFP on k and y.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Under standard assumptions (along with A′′ < 0), the
planner’s choice is characterized by the binding constraints, which are the two last
equations in the characterization (8)
ct + kt+1 = yt
yt = A(yt−1)F (kt, lt)
(59)
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and the first-order conditions
βtu′(ct)
−βtv′(lt)
0
0
 = λt−1

0
0
1
0
+ λt

1
0
0
−1

+ µt

0
−A(yt−1)FL(kt, lt)
−A(yt−1)FK(kt, lt)
1
+ µt+1

0
0
0
−A′(yt)F (kt+1, lt+1)

(60)
for all t and some sequences of positive multipliers λt and µt. Equivalently, the
first-order conditions are
βtu′(ct) = λt
βtv′(lt) = µtA(yt−1)FL(kt, lt)
λt−1 = µtA(yt−1)FK(kt, lt)
λt = µt − µt+1A′(yt)F (kt+1, lt+1)
(61)
so that, dividing the first equation by the second,
v′(lt)
u′(ct)
=
µt
λt
A(yt−1)FL(kt, lt) (62)
while the fourth can be written as
µt
λt
= 1 +
µt+1
λt
A′(yt)F (kt+1, lt+1) (63)
and the third as
µt+1
λt
=
1
A(yt)FK(kt+1, lt+1)
(64)
so that
v′(lt)
u′(ct)
= A(yt−1)FL(kt, lt)
[
1 +
A′(yt)F (kt+1, lt+1)
A(yt)FK(kt+1, lt+1)
]
(65)
which is the first equation in the characterization (8) above.
Similarly,
1
β
u′(ct)
u′(ct+1)
=
λt
λt+1
=
λt
µt+1
µt+1
λt+1
(66)
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but, from the third equation,
λt
µt+1
= A(yt)FK(kt+1, lt+1) (67)
and, from the fourth,
µt+1
λt+1
= 1 +
µt+2
λt+1
A′(yt+1)F (kt+2, lt+2) (68)
i.e.
µt+1
λt+1
= 1 +
A′(yt+1)F (kt+2, lt+2)
A(yt+1)FK(kt+2, lt+2)
(69)
so that
1
β
u′(ct)
u′(ct+1)
= A(yt)FK(kt+1, lt+1)
[
1 +
A′(yt+1)F (kt+2, lt+2)
A(yt+1)FK(kt+2, lt+2)
]
(70)
which is the second equation in the characterization (8) above. QED
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider the case
u(c) = ln c
v(l) = − ln(1− l)
A(y) = yγ
F (k, l) = kαl1−α
(71)
with l being the share of a unit of time supplied each period as labor, and α, γ ∈
(0, 1).13
The allocations chosen by the planner or the market under the policy (based on
sufficiently lagged variables) are then:
(1) the planner’s choice solves
ct
1− lt = y
γ
t−1(1− α)
(kt
lt
)α[1 + γ
α
kt+1
yt
]
1
β
ct+1
ct
= yγt α
(kt+1
lt+1
)α−1[1 + γ
α
kt+2
yt+1
]
ct + kt+1 = y
γ
t−1k
α
t l
1−α
t
yt = y
γ
t−1k
α
t l
1−α
t
(72)
13Note that the period utility u(c)− v(l) = ln c+ ln(1− l) is concave in both consumption c and
labor l (as well as in consumption c and leisure 1− l).
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from where, lagging one period the second equation and dividing it by the
first, one gets that
kt = β
α
1− α ·
lt
1− lt ct−1. (73)
This allows to express the planner’s choice in ct, lt, and yt as
ct = y
γ
t−1(1− α)
(
β
α
1− α
)α( lt
1− lt
)α
cαt−1
1− lt
lαt
[
1 + β
γ
1− α
lt+1
1− lt+1
ct
yt
]
ct + β
α
1− α ·
lt
1− lt ct = y
γ
t−1
(
β
α
1− α
)α( lt
1− lt
)α
cαt−1l
1−α
t
yt = y
γ
t−1
(
β
α
1− α
)α( lt
1− lt
)α
cαt−1l
1−α
t
(74)
which implies (from the first and third equations)
ct
yt
lt
1− lt = (1− α)
[
1 + β
γ
1− α ·
ct
yt
lt+1
1− lt+1
]
(75)
(2) the competitive equilibria under the proposed policy, but sufficiently lagged
in order to make it depend on observed variables at t, namely
τkt = −
A′(yt−2)F (kt−1, lt−1)
A(yt−2)FK(kt−1, lt−1)
= τ lt (76)
are characterized by
ct
1− lt = y
γ
t−1(1− α)
(kt
lt
)α[1 + γ
α
kt−1
yt−2
]
1
β
ct+1
ct
= yγt α
(kt+1
lt+1
)α−1[1 + γ
α
kt
yt−1
]
ct + kt+1 = y
γ
t−1k
α
t l
1−α
t
yt = y
γ
t−1k
α
t l
1−α
t
(77)
from where (lagging the second equation one period and dividing it by the
first) one gets equation (73) above again, which allows to express the com-
petitive equilibria in ct, lt, and yt as
ct = y
γ
t−1(1− α)
(
β
α
1− α
)α( lt
1− lt
)α
cαt−1
1− lt
l−αt
[
1 + β
γ
1− α
lt−1
1− lt−1
ct−2
yt−2
]
ct + β
α
1− α
lt
1− lt ct = y
γ
t−1
(
β
α
1− α
)α( lt
1− lt
)α
cαt−1l
1−α
t
yt = y
γ
t−1
(
β
α
1− α
)α( lt
1− lt
)α
cαt−1l
1−α
t
(78)
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implying (from the first and third equations)
ct
yt
lt
1− lt = (1− α)
[
1 + β
γ
1− α
ct−2
yt−2
lt−1
1− lt−1
]
(79)
In both cases, from the feasibility condition
ct + kt+1 = y
γ
t−1k
α
t l
1−α
t = yt (80)
and (73) one can obtain
lt
1− lt =
1− α
βα
( 1
ct−1/yt−1
− 1
)
(81)
so that the dynamics in (75) and (81) can be expressed in the share of consumption
in output as follows
(1) for the planner
ct
yt
1
βα
(
1− ct−1
yt−1
)
=
[
1 +
γ
α
(
1− ct
yt
)] ct−1
yt−1
(82)
(2) for the competitive equilibrium under the policy
ct
yt
1
βα
(
1− ct−1
yt−1
)
=
[
1 +
γ
α
(
1− ct−2
yt−2
)] ct−1
yt−1
(83)
Notice that, while the market’s consumption share of output dynamics is a difference
equation of order 1 and the planner’s is of order 2, the share nonetheless the same
balanced growth split of output between consumption and savings, i.e.
1− c
y
=
βα
1− βγ (84)
as the steady state capital-output ratio and
c
y
=
1− β(γ + α)
1− βγ (85)
as the steady state consumption-output ratio, which are in (0, 1) as long as β(γ +
α) < 1.
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Moreover, that balanced growth path is globally stable in the market dynamics
under the given policy, so that in the limit the policy implements the planner’s
balanced growth path. In effect, the second-order market dynamics can be made
into a first-order one writing it as( ct+1
yt+1
ct
yt
)
= G
( ct
yt
ct−1
yt−1
)
=
(
β
[
α+ γ
(
1− ct−1yt−1
)] ct
yt
1− ctyt
ct
yt
)
(86)
Its linearization around the steady state consumption-output ratio( ct+1
yt+1
− cy
ct
yt
− cy
)
=
(
1−βγ
βα [β(γ + α)− 1] γα
1 0
)( ct
yt
− cy
ct−1
yt−1
− cy
)
(87)
has eigenvalues of modulus smaller than one if
∣∣∣ 1−βγβα ∣∣∣ < 1 (or equivalently γ −α <
1
β < γ + α), which is satisfied for reasonable parameters like, for instance, α = .3
and β = .9 = γ.14
Finally, the rate of growth along the planner’s balance-growth path follows from
the feasibility constraint divided by output
ct
yt
+
kt+1
yt
=
yγ+αt−1
yt
kαt
yαt−1
l1−αt (88)
since (i) the consumption-output and capital-output ratios are constant, which im-
plies lt constant too from (81), so that the first factor on the right-hand in (88) side
must be constant too. That is to say,
yt = Cy
γ+α
t−1 (89)
for some constant C, where γ + α > 1 under the sufficient condition for global
stability above. This means that the balanced-growth path can either exhibit un-
boundedly increasing levels of output consumption and investment, or monoton-
ically decreasing ones collapsing to zero in the limit, depending on whether the
initial y0 is above or below 1. QED
14The condition on parameters is not necessary but just sufficient, and hence unduly restrictive.
Many more profiles of parameters still make the market dynamics under the policy converge to the
planner’s balanced growth split of output between consumption and savings. In effect, since the
sum of the eigenvalues coincides with the trace of the Jacobian at the steady state 1−βγ
βα
and their
product with its determinant [1− β(α+ γ)] γ
α
, and the latter is positive (so that both eigenvalues
have the same sign), then a trace smaller than one guarantees that both of them have a modulus
smaller than one.
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Proof of Proposition 8. The planner’s choice is characterized by the first-order con-
ditions, for t ≥ 1,


ηt−1µiui′0 (c
it
0 )
ηt−1µiui′1 (c
it
1 )
−ηt−1µivi′(lit)
0

i
0
 = λt


µi
0
0
µi

i−1
+ λt+1


0
µi 1n
0
0

i
0

+ ρt


0
0
−µiA(yt−1)FL(kt−1n , lt)
0

i
1

+ ρt+1


0
0
0
−µiA(yt)FK(ktn , lt+1) 1n

i
−A′(yt)F (ktn , lt+1)

(90)
and
λ1 = η−1ui′1 (c
i0
1 )n (91)
for some λt, λt+1, ρt, ρt+1 > 0, and
∑
i
µi
[
cit0 +
cit−11
n
+ kit
]
= yt
yt−1 = A(yt−1)F (
kt−1
n
, lt)
(92)
with kt =
∑
i µ
ikit and lt =
∑
i µ
ilit, for all t ≥ 1, from where (31,32) follow. QED
Solution to the egalitarian planner’s steady state problem (footnote 12). It can be
straightforwardly checked from the first-oder conditions that, as η → 1, the ratio’s
of the planner’s multipliers λ
t
λt+1 and
ρt
ρt+1 in (31,32) converge to 1 too, in which case
1 +
A′(y)F ( kn , l)
A(y)FK( kn , l)
n =
1
1−A′(y)F ( kn , l)
(93)
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so that the right-hand sides in (31) and (42) coincide.15 Equivalently, the egalitarian
planner’s allocation can be found as the allocation solving the problem
max
0≤ci0,ci1,ki,li,y
∑
i
µi
[
ui0(c
i
0) + u
i
1(c
i
1)− vi(li)
]
∑
i
µi
[
ci0 +
ci1
n
+ ki
] ≤ y
y ≤ A(y)F (k
n
, l)
(95)
—where k =
∑
i µ
iki and l =
∑
i µ
ili— given ki and y, which is characterized by
the first-order conditions

µiui′0 (c
i
0)
µiui′1 (c
i
1)
0
−µivi′(li)

i
0
 = λ


µi
µi 1n
µi
0

i−1
+ ρ


0
0
−µiA(y)FK( kn , l) 1n
−µiA(y)FL( kn , l)

i
1−A′(y)F ( kn , l)
 (96)
for some λ, ρ > 0, and ∑
i
µi
[
ci0 +
ci1
n
+ ki
]
= y
y = A(y)F (
k
n
, l)
(97)
from which —eliminating the multipliers λ > 0 and ρ > 0 — (42) follows. QED
Proof of Proposition 11. The agent’s choice under the stated policy solution to (37)
is characterized by the first-order conditions
ui′0 (c
it
0 )
ui′1 (c
it
1 )
0
0
−vi′(lit)
 = λit

1
0
1
1
pt
−(1 + τ t0)wt
+ µit

0
1
−(1 + τ t1)rt+1
− 1pt+1
0
 (99)
for some λit, µit > 0, and the binding budget constraints. The output per worker
at t is given by (26), as before, and similarly the real wage and rental rate of capital
15Note that the existence of a egalitarian planner’s steady state requires it to satisfy A′(y)F ( k
n
, l) <
1.
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by (27), so that a competitve equilibrium under a period-by-period balanced policy
of taxes and transfers τ t0, τ
t
1, T
t
0 is characterized by the following dynamics
16
ui′0 (c
it
0 )
ui′1 (c
it
1 )
=
pt
pt+1
= (1 + τ t1)A(yt)FK(
kt
n
, lt+1)
vi′(lit)
ui′0 (c
it
0 )
= (1 + τ t0)A(yt−1)FL(
kt−1
n
, lt)
cit0 + k
it +
M it
pt
= (1 + τ t0)A(yt−1)FL(
kt−1
n
, lt)lit − T t0
cit1 = (1+τ
t
1)A(yt)FK(
kt
n
, lt+1)kit +
M it
pt+1
yt = A(yt−1)F (
kt−1
n
, lt)
M t
M t+1
= n∑
j
µjA(yt)
[
τ t+10 FL(
kt
n
,lt+1)ljt + τ t1FK(
kt
n
, lt+1)
kjt
n
]
= T t+10
(100)
with kt =
∑
j µ
jkjt, lt =
∑
j µ
j ljt, and M t =
∑
i µ
iM it, —where the last two
conditions are, respectively, equivalent to the feasibility of the allocation, and the
period by period balance of the government budget— and whose steady state char-
acterized by
ui′0 (c
i
0)
ui′1 (c
i
1)
= n = (1 + τ1)A(y)FK(
k
n
, l)
vi′(li)
ui′0 (c
i
0)
= (1 + τ0)A(y)FL(
k
n
, l)
ci0 + k
i +mi = (1 + τ0)A(y)FL(
k
n
, l)li − T0
ci1
n
= (1 + τ1)A(y)FK(
k
n
, l)
ki
n
+mi
y = A(y)F (
k
n
, l)
(101)
is, by direct substitution, the egalitarian planner’s steady state solution to (30) in
16For a period-by-period balanced policy, i.e. such that T t0 =
P
i µi
`
τ t0wtl
it + τ t−11 rt
kit−1
n
´
the
feasibility of the allocation of resources is again equivalent to M
t
Mt+1
= n, where Mt =
P
i µ
iM it.
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(42) if the subsidy rates are constant and equal to the positive rate
τ =
1
1−A′(y¯)F ( k¯n , l¯)
− 1 > 0 (102)
from identifying the right-hand sides of any of the first two lines in (42) and (101)
above, or equivalently —from the second equation in the first line in (42)—
τ =
n
A(y¯)Fk( k¯n , l¯)
− 1 > 0 (103)
and the policy is period by period balanced by a labor income lump-sum tax
T0 = A(y¯)
[
τ0FL(
k¯
n
, l¯)l¯ + τ1FK(
k¯
n
, l¯)
k¯
n
]
(104)
which by the homogeneity of degree 1 of F amounts to
T0 = τA(y¯)F (
k¯
n
, l¯) (105)
QED
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